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DRAFT (EMPLOYM1.PAP) 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT: NORTH AND SOUTH.  NOTES FOR A GLOBAL 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR THE 1990S. 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1. The notes were originally prepared for the South Centre (the 
successor to the South Commission) as its contribution to a 
development agenda for the UN for the 1990s.  The notes suggest 
employment as  the central focus of the new development agenda 
for the global community. 
 
2. Agendas for Development in previous decades have drawn attention 
to, and provided prescriptions for, a number of economic and social 
problems affecting/afflicting the South.  The approach adopted 
has tended to place the major actors - the North and the South 
- in a donor/recipient relationship, based on notions of 
responsibility, solidarity and other moral compunctions.  Mutual, 
if different, interests, if proclaimed, were never deemed 
sufficiently tangible in the short term to generate the required 
action in the North. 
 
3. In the 1990s, despite some changes for the better in some 
regions, large parts of the South are confronted by problems more 
difficult than before, because of the set-backs suffered by these 
countries during the 1980s.  It is not necessary to catalogue these 
problems, many of which in any case are interrelated.  Suffice 
it to say that,in Latin America after a sustained rise in the 
previous three decades, per capita incomes fell by 10 per cent 
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in the 1980s. In Sub-Saharan Africa, per capita incomes fell on 
average by as much as 25 per cent during the same period, which 
has rightly been called the 'lost decade' for these two developing 
continents. 
 
4. These notes propose that the policy focus for national and 
international action in a new agenda for development should 
concentrate on the central problem of creating productive 
employment opportunities for the South's burgeoning population 
and labour force into the new millennium. Employment is not only 
important in itself.  It is crucial because of its all-pervading 
comprehensive economic and social linkages.  Unemployment leads 
to poverty, social degradation, marginalization and, history tells 
us that, if it reaches a high level, it often gives rise to social 
and political strife, with deleterious consequences. 
 
5. However, it is not the South alone that is confronted with an 
employment problem today. Over the last decade or more,by 
post-World War II standards, the industrial countries of the North 
have been experiencing extremely high rates of unemployment. The 
workers, trade unionists and politicians in these countries 
increasingly blame competition from cheap labour products from 
the developing economies for these job losses. Hence, the growing 
populist demands for protection in one form or another in many 
of these countries. 
 
6. Eradicating unemployment and creating adequate remunerative 
employment opportunities is therefore a common concern in both 
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the North and the South.  The main thesis of this paper is that 
in an interdependent world economy the optimal solution to the 
employment and unemployment problem lies in co-operative action: 
both regions should follow 'positive sum' policies which help to 
create jobs in the North as well as the South in a virtuous circle 
of cumulative causation.  Indeed not only are such co-operative 
policies optimal, they are in important ways the only ones which 
are feasible.  In other words, neither the North nor the South, 
can resolve this problem on its own. 
 
7. The essential approach of this paper is historical.  It looks 
back to a previous era of North-South co-operation in the not too 
distant past - the golden age of capitalist development between 
1950 and 1973 - when countries in both regions prospered. Indeed 
during this period of high employment and growth for the world 
economy, the competitive game, not only between the North and the 
South but among nation states in general was by and large played 
in a non-zero sum way. The paper tries to draw lessons from this 
harmonious period of world economic development for the present. 
 
II.  The Dimensions of the Employment Problem:  South and North 
 
IIa.  The South 
 
8. The employment situation in the South, particularly in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa is dire.  There are not only current 
high rates of urban, especially youth and 'educated' unemployment,
1
 
                     
    
1
 The recorded rates of unemployment in most developing 
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but there is also a necessity to provide productive jobs for a 
labour force which is growing at approximately 3 per cent a year.
2
 
 
9. On the basis of past relationships between economic variables, 
to create jobs at this rate in order to meet the employment needs 
of new entrants to the labour force, the economies of these 
countries need to grow at a rate of about 6 per cent per annum.
3
 
 If the current high levels of unemployed and underemployed in 
these developing countries are also to be reduced, the growth rate 
will need to be higher still.  Unfortunately, in the "lost decade" 
of the 1980s, the rate of economic growth has been considerably 
less than is required: it has been only of the order of 2.1 per 
cent per annum in Sub-Saharan Africa and 1.6 per cent per annum 
in Latin America. [see Appendix, Table 1].  
                                                                
countries tend to be relatively low. This is because in the virtual 
absence of a publically provided social security system, people 
are obliged to engage in any economic activity, howsoever 
non-remunerative and non-productive that may be. The problem of 
'unemployment' in poor countries, therefore, manifests itself 
generally in the form of what Joan Robinson called 'disguised 
unemployment', or as 'underemployment'.  
      
2
 The world labour force in 1993 is estimated to be 2.4 
billion people, of whom 1.8 billion (75 per cent) are in developing 
countries. The United Nations estimates that the labour force in 
developing countries will in the foreseeable future grow at a rate 
of approximately 3 per cent per annum. In Africa, the rate of labour 
force growth is expected to increase to 3.5 per cent a year. [UN, 
1993]. 
     
3
 To illustrate, the rate of growth of labour force in Mexico 
is about 3 per cent p.a. The long term trend rate of growth of 
productivity in the period 1950-80 has also been about 3 per cent 
p.a. This means that GDP needs to grow at nearly 6 per cent per 
annum in order just to provide jobs for the new entrants in the 
labour force. Similarly, the UN Social Report [UN 1993] notes that 
since about one half of all output accrues to labour, developing 
economies will need to grow at 6 per cent a year, during the present 
decade, in order to absorb the growing labour force at current 
levels of income. 
 
 
5 
 
10. One outstanding success story for the South during the recent 
period has been the extremely good economic performance of the 
Asian countries, particularly those in East Asia, including China. 
 In contrast with the Latin American and African countries which 
suffered economic collapse in the 1980s, the East as well as the 
South Asian countries either maintained their high previous 
momentum of economic growth or achieved a trend increase in it. 
The industrial revolution, which has been interrupted in Africa 
and Latin America, proceeded apace in these Asian countries, 
leading to substantial creation of new jobs and higher real wages.
4
 
 However, even these countries are faced with a serious potential 
employment problem. 
 
11. In countries like China and India, while agriculture accounts 
for a decreasing proportion of national output as they 
industrialize, the bulk of their population and labour force is 
still engaged in agriculture.  The challenge in these countries 
is to provide adequate employment opportunities in industry and 
services as people leave the rural sector.  Given the size of the 
rural population, this is an enormous task. 
                     
     
4
 The South and East Asian countries recorded an increase 
of more than 50 per cent in their per capita incomes in the 1980s. 
 This compares, as noted earlier, with significant reductions in 
per capita incomes in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
'lost decade'.  There is a large literature on why the Asian 
countries succeeded and the Latin Americans so comprehensively 
failed in this period.  For different views on this subject see 
 among others, Sachs (1985), World Bank (1991, 1993), Fishlow 
(1991), Hughes and Singh (1991), Singh (1993).  The reasons for 
the economic failure in Sub-Saharan Africa are discussed in Singh 
(1987, 1994). 
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12. The employment question is directly linked to that of the 
reduction of poverty.  At the microeconomic level a reasonably 
remunerative job will keep a family out of poverty.  At the 
macroeconomic level, the relationship between the two, even though 
indirect, is equally close.  Just as the creation of sufficient 
employment opportunities requires a reasonable rate of economic 
growth, so does the eradication of poverty and meeting the minimum 
basic needs of the people.
5
 
 
13. Although at any one time, a redistribution of national output 
may enable a society to better meet the basic needs of its people, 
on a longer term basis such needs can only be met if there is an 
expansion of the national economy.  Economic growth generates 
increased employment and household incomes; equally importantly, 
it increases government revenues, which may be spent on health, 
education, clean water supplies and other basic needs of the 
people.
6
  
                     
     
5
For the relationship between employment, basic needs, 
poverty and economic growth, see Singh (1979, 1992).  See also 
ILO (1976). 
     
6
 In its influential 1976 report, the ILO estiamted that even 
allowing for some redistribution of incomes, if the minimun basic 
needs of the poorest 20 per cent of the Third World's population 
were to be met by the year 2000, their economies would have to 
grow at an annual average rate of 7 to 8 per cent a year. These 
rates are not all that different from those required to create 
sufficient employment opportunities for the South's growing 
population.  
 
During the last 15 years, those economies (mainly in Asia) that 
were able to achieve such high rates of growth have succeeded in 
significantly reducing poverty in their countries. On the other 
hand, low economic growth in the Latin American and the African 
countries over the recent period has had a serious negative effect 
both on poverty and employment generation in these economies.   
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IIb. Unemployment in the North 
 
14. The European economies are today experiencing very high rates 
of unemployment.  The current rates in leading economies like 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom approximate 10 per cent of 
the labour force.  In Spain and Finland, the unemployment rate 
is over 15 per cent.  In Sweden, which maintained high levels of 
employment throughout the slow-growing 1980s, the rate of 
unemployment has increased from 1.5 per cent of the labour force 
in 1990 to well over 10 per cent now in a very short period of 
time. 
 
15. The United States has experienced somewhat lower unemployment 
than the European countries.
7
  One reason for this is that the 
welfare provision in that country is not as extensive as that in 
Europe, so that many people are obliged to seek work even at 
non-remunerative wage levels.  It is striking that in the U.S. 
economy average real wages have hardly increased over the last 
twenty years.
8
  Thus a large proportion of individuals and families 
are living below the poverty line.  Hence the emphasis and the 
political compulsions of the present U.S. administration are on 
                     
     
7
Between 1983 and 1992, the average unemployment rate in 
France, Italy and UK was around 10 per cent of the labour force. 
 The corresponding figure for the US for this decade was 6.7 per 
cent. Eatwell (1994, page 5). 
     
8
The average real compensation of the American worker in 1991 
was only 6 per cent higher than it had been in 1973.  Moreover, 
compensation has risen only for the highly educated workers; the 
real wages of blue collar workers have fallen in most years since 
1973. Krugman and Lawrence (1993). 
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creating remunerative jobs, not just any jobs. 
 
 
III. Current Employment Challenge in Historical Context 
 
16. In the context of post-war economic history, the current high 
rates of unemployment in the North are a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  During the 1950s and the 1960s, leading countries 
of the North not only enjoyed full employment but had over-full 
employment.  In addition to being able to employ all their own 
people, these countries also provided jobs for additional labour 
from abroad.  In countries like France and West Germany nearly 
10 per cent of the labour force came from abroad.  The contrast 
with the current employment situation could not be more striking. 
 
17. The period 1950-1973 has been aptly described as the Golden 
Age of the world economy.  In the advanced economies during this 
period, there was a historically unprecedented expansion of 
production and consumption at a rate of nearly 5 per cent a year. 
 This was accompanied by a huge increase in world trade, 
particularly in the export of manufactured products,  The latter 
grew in volume terms at a very fast rate of nearly 10 per cent 
a year. Most developing countries also participated in and 
benefitted from this world wide prosperity. Many Asian and Latin 
American countries embarked on a veritable industrial revolution 
in these post-war decades.   
 
18. The Golden Age of simultaneous prosperity for the North and 
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the South evidently came to an end with the first oil shock in 
1973. Since then, the rate of growth of the OECD and the world 
GDP has nearly halved. Significantly, the recorded rate during 
the last twenty years is much more in line with the long term trend 
rate of growth of industrial countries in the hundred years before 
the Golden Age. (Reynolds, 1983; World Bank, 1987).  It is 
therefore not surprising to find the high rates of unemployment 
recently experienced by the OECD -- rates which were unthinkable 
in the preceding period. It is for the same reason, that for a 
large number of countries in the South, in contrast to the 
industrial revolution and significant rises in the average 
standard of living of the Golden Age, the last fifteen years have 
been marked by de-industrialisation and considerable falls in per 
capita incomes. The end of the Golden Age has also coincided with 
a significant deceleration in the expansion of world trade in 
manufactures.  
 
19. The central issue for the world community is whether such a 
dynamic period associated with fuller employment can be 
re-created.  This hinges on understanding how this Golden Age of 
plenty of jobs and fast economic growth for an extended period 
of nearly a quarter of a century occurred and why it ended. 
 
 
IV. The national and international institutional arrangements 
which made possible full employment in the North and fast economic 
growth worldwide. 
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20. Considered purely in statistical terms, in the long history 
of economic development in industrial countries, the post-war 
quarter century of the Golden Age appears to be a historical 
aberration.  Measured in terms of the rates of growth of output, 
productivity, capital stock, the period 1950-73 in advanced 
economies as a whole unquestionably represents a highly distinct 
deviation from the long-term trend values of these variables over 
the last two centuries. (See Glyn,Hughes, Lipietz and Singh,1990; 
Maddison, 1982).   
 
21. Turning to economic analysis, detailed examination of the data 
show that the length,  steadiness, speed and spread of the Golden 
Age economic boom was such that the they could not be accounted 
for  by an accidental combination of favourable economic 
circumstances.  Rather, the extraordinary economic performance 
of the industrial countries was brought about and sustained by 
a unique historical conjuncture which created a specific economic 
regime.
9
 This regime, which differed in very important respects 
from the inter-war pattern of development, made full employment 
of labour force and full utilisaton of resources, a primary 
objective inter alia for the governments to pursue.
10
 
                     
     
9
 For reasons of space, what follows is necessarily  a highly 
schematic and condensed account of the analysis of large question: 
why did the Golden Age arise and why did it come to an end?  This 
summary is based on Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz and Singh (1990) to which 
the reader is referred for a full discussion of these issues.  
For some alternative interpretations, see Maddison (1982); Bruno 
and Sachs (1985); Matthews and Bowen (1987); Kindleberger (1993). 
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 How this economic regime came to be established in the 
post-war period is a complex phenomenon which had a great deal 
to do with the contention between the liberal, free market 
capitalist world economic order led by the United States and the 
alternative, represented by the then triumphant Soviet Union. It 
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22. The most important macro-economic characteristics of the 
Golden Age pattern of economic development were: 
 (a) rapid and parallel growth of productivity and capital 
stock per worker: 
 (b) parallel growth of real wages and productivity. 
The significance of these two relations is that they guarantee 
both a roughly constant profit rate and roughly equal growth of 
consumption and production, thus ratifying and maintaining the 
initial rate of accumulation.  However, such a macro-economic 
growth path could only be perpetuated if it were compatible with 
the behaviour of individual economic agents - firms , workers, 
consumers.  This compatibility in the Golden Age was insured by 
a social consensus around institutional arrangements in respect 
of setting of wages and prices, the distribution between wages 
and profits, and the state fiscal, credit and welfare policies 
which guaranteed minimum living standards and maintained aggregate 
demand.  In the sphere of wage setting, for example, productivity 
wage bargaining which flourished during this period played a key 
role both in keeping a rough constancy of the share of wages and 
profits in the national product and also in helping to provide 
an adequate rate of growth in consumer demand.  Similarly, at the 
international level, under the leadership of a singe hegemonic 
                                                                
will be recalled that at the end of the second world war the Soviet 
model had important attractions for people in Western Europe. The 
country had just played a critical role in defeating fascism; the 
crimes of the Stalin era had not yet been revealed. Equally 
importantly, compared with the mass unemployment in the inter-war 
period in the industrial countries, Soviet planning was regarded 
as having achieved full employment of resources. See further Glyn, 
Hughes, Lipietz and Singh (1990). 
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power for much of this period, the US, the global economic system 
functioned under stable monetary and trading arrangements.   
 
23. The process of the erosion of the Golden Age began well before 
the oil price shock of 1973.  Serious difficulties arose at the 
levels of both the national and the international regulatory 
regimes;  these began to interact with each other in a cumulatively 
adverse way to the detriment of the system as a whole.  The Bretton 
Woods monetary system broke down in the late 1960s, partly as a 
consequence of the success of the Golden Age itself - the rise 
of the Japanese, the West German and other European countries in 
the international market place led to serious balance of payments 
problems for  the US, hitherto the lynch pin of the international 
system.  There is also evidence of a productivity slow-down by 
the late 1960s in several leading industrial countries, which was 
not matched by a deceleration in the rate of growth of real wages, 
thus leading to a profit squeeze. 
  
24. By the early 1970s, the Golden Age system was so fragile, that 
it disintegrated under the impact of the two oil shocks, thus 
pushing the world economy into a period of prolonged slow growth 
which began in 1973.  The social consensus of the Golden years 
which was crucial to the functioning of the economic system as 
a whole broke down.  For a while, after the first oil shock, the 
governments of the OECD countries tried to restore the Golden Age 
institutional consensus, by following expansionary economic 
policies. But, since inflation could not be controlled, this 
attempt was finally abandoned in 1979.  
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25. This abandonment was symbolized by the so-called 'Volcker 
shock' (named after the then Chairman of the U.S. Ferderal Reserve, 
Paul Volcker). This resulted in the implementation of deeply 
contractionary monetary policies in the United States and these 
were subsequently widely imitated elsewhere, particularly in the 
UK. These policies led to a more than ten fold jump in real interest 
rates compared with the preceding period and gave rise to a 
prolonged recession in the industrial countries.  
 
26. The effects on the Third World countries of these measures 
was devastating. They were disadvantaged through the following 
main channels: a) a reduction in the demand for the South's products 
in the North; b) as a consequence, a big fall in commodity prices 
and adverse terms of trade; c) a big rise in debt service payments; 
d) a sudden and a large fall in normal capital flows to the South, 
particularly to the African and Latin American economies. The net 
result has been a long economic crisis and the 'lost decade' of 
the 1980s for a large parts of the South.  
  
27. In the 1980s and into the 1990s, the leading OECD governments 
have been attempting to create a new economic system based much 
more on free market principles but this does not yet command a 
broad social consensus in these countries. In pursuit of this 
objective, there has been a widespread movement towards 
"privatisation", "de-regulation" and the erosion of Golden Age 
arrangements with respect for example to wage bargaining and to 
the provisions of the welfare state (with the professed aim of 
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increasing labour market flexibility).   
 
28. At one level this post-1980 development model has had some 
success - the most conspicuous being the sharp decline in the OECD 
rate of inflation. Instead of 'stagflation' of the 1970s - ie. 
low growth and high inflation - the 1980s and the 1990s so far, 
have been characterised by low growth and low inflation. However, 
against this, as noted earlier, most OECD countries, especially 
in Western Europe, are suffering from very high rates of 
unemployment. There are also large payments imbalances among the 
leading countries as well as fragile financial markets. On present 
projections of leading international organizations, the prospects 
for an appreciable increase in rates of economic growth and for 
a substantial reduction in unemployment in the OECD economies, 
in the foreseeable future, are rather gloomy.
11
   
 
29. However, notwithstanding the fall of the Golden Age and the 
consequent slow-down in the growth of world production and trade, 
it is important to appreciate that the world economy is far more 
integrated than ever before.  If greater economic integration is 
                     
     
11
 With respect to unemployment in Europe, Dreze and 
Malinvaud(1993) observe: "The Annual Economic Report of the EEC 
for 1993 advocates a forcast of GDP growth for 1993 of less than 
1%, with employment falling and unemployment rising to similar 
extents. More significant perhaps is the medium term assessment. 
"Estimates of potential growth are always difficult to make, but 
it seems clear that without a significant break from recent trends 
that the Community economy can only be expected to return gradually 
to rates of growth to between 2 to 2.5%. These are barely sufficient 
to stabilise unemployment and do not open up any medium term 
prospect of significant reductions". Even if in 1995-96 growth 
were to return to rates of about 3%, as various medium-term forcasts 
suggest, unemployment could be still as high as 10 to 11%". 
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supposed to lead to more efficient resource utilisation and hence 
faster economic growth, as the Bretton Woods institutions contend, 
this clearly has not happened.  Be that as it may, close 
international financial integration has been a particularly 
significant feature of the post-1973 world economy.  Such 
integration has been brought about by the more or less complete 
abolition of exchange controls in leading industrial economies 
and the globalisation of the stock markets. (Cosh, Hughes and 
Singh, 1992). 
 
 
 
V. Post-War Industrial revolution in the Third World and its 
interruption in the 1980s in Africa and Latin America. 
 
30. Prior to the economic crisis of the 1980s, the post-war era 
from 1950 to 1980 was also, in an important sense, a Golden Age 
of development for the poor countries of the world. During this 
period, developing countries on average made historically 
unprecedented economic and industrial progress. In the propitious 
circumstances following the end of the Second World War, many of 
these countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, began to carry 
out an industrial revolution - a revolution that they had been 
prevented from implementing fifty or a hundred years earlier, on 
account of the rather different world economic and political 
conditions which then prevailed. Even developing countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which started with extremely unfavourable 
initial conditions when colonial rule ended, managed to increase 
 
 
16 
their share of world manufacturing production during the 1960s 
and the 1970s. More significantly, a group of Asian and Latin 
American nations - the so called NICs - were especially successful 
in the post World War II period in establishing technical, 
scientific and industrial infrastructures, in training their 
labour forces, in creating managerial and organisational 
capacities and in developing broad based industrial structures. 
By the 1970s these countries were beginning to provide formidable 
competition to the rich industrial economies in a range of consumer 
and producer goods industries.  
 
31. In statistical terms, the Third World's economic achievements 
of the three decades 1950-80 are a story without parallel in world 
development history. During this period, the South surpassed the 
80-year record of the North's 19th century (1820-1900) advance. 
The South did this in half the time, at twice the growth rates 
and with five times the North's population in the 19th 
century.[Patel,1992].  
 
32. In addition to these economic gains, the Third World countries 
during this period also made extraordinary advances in the social 
fields of health and education. Consider for example literacy 
rates. The North's rates have been estimated to have averaged below 
25 percent in 1850 and below 50 percent in 1900. The corresponding 
level of of literacy in the South was about 30 percent in 1950. 
By the 1980s, however, it had risen to 50 percent in Africa, 70 
percent in Asia and 80 percent in Latin America. More 
significantly, despite all the shortcomings both in the data itself 
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and in the quality of education imparted in developing countries, 
the North-South educational gap narrowed spectacularly during 
these decades of relative prosperity.  
 
33. Similarly this period witnessed vast improvements in public 
health and life expectancy in the South. Life expectancy rose from 
around 40 years in 1950 to 60 years by the mid 1980s - in other 
words 20 years were added to the life of the average citizen of 
the South. Life expectancy for the females increased even more 
than for males almost everywhere in the South. 
    
 
VI. Does the South's Industrial Revolution Cause 
Deindustrialisation in the North? 
 
34. The impressive industrialisation of the Third World during 
its Golden Age raises the important question whether it is 
responsible for deindustrialisation and the rise in overall 
unemployment in the advanced countries. It is indeed true that 
during the last two decades manufactured exports from the South 
to the North have been rising at a fast rate
12
. It is also the 
                     
     
12
 To illustrate, between 1965 and 1973, the rate of growth 
of manufacturing exports of the developed countries was much the 
same as that of the developing countries - about 10% per annum 
at constant prices. Between 1973 and 1985, the former's exports 
grew only at 4.4 per cent per annum, whilst the latter's increased 
at an incredible 12.3 per cent per annum. Moreover, much the larger 
part of the Third World's manufactured exports go to the North. 
 Further, there is evidence that the developing countries are 
exporting not only the traditional labour intensive and resource 
based products, but are also recording a very fast growth in the 
exports of a variety of products of capital goods industries. 
(World Bank, 1987; UNCTAD, 1993)  
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case that in industrial countries the share of output and 
employment in manufacturing, particularly the latter, has fallen 
substantially in the same period
13
. The salient analytical question 
is whether this is just a coincidence, or whether one has caused 
the other.     
 
35. This is by no means a straight forward issue, since 
de-industrialisation and the rise in overall unemployment in the 
industrial countries can be caused by a whole range of other factors 
as well. For example, a falling share of manufacturing employment 
in the labour force is a long run phenomenon of economic development 
which arises from technological change and the faster growth of 
productivity in manufacturing than in services. 
De-industrialisation in this sense may simply be like 
de-ruralisation(ie. falling share of agricultural employment) 
which has occured in the course of this century in most advanced 
countries, without any neccessarily negative economic 
conotations. Nevertheless, it is possible for 
de-industrialisation in a particular country to occur at a rate 
that is much too rapid so that the economy is prevented from 
achieving its full potential.
14
 
 
36. In view of the complexity of the subject, there is no agreement 
                     
     
13
 In the US, manufacturing employment as a percentage of 
civilian employment has fallen from 24.2 per cent in 1974 to 18 
per cent in 1990; in the UK the corresponding figures are 34.6 
and 22.5 per cent; in Japan 27.2 and 24.1 per cent and in Germany 
35.8 and 31.5 per cent respectively. OECD (1992). 
     
14
 See Singh(1977); Carincross(1979). 
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in the literature on the appropriate theoretical or empirical 
models for analysing the impact of Third World competition on 
manufacturing output and employment in the North. There exist 
instead alternative paradigms, which lead to very different policy 
conclusions. According to the dominant neoclassical paradigm, 
trade does not cause unemployment (see, for example Malinvaud). 
The observed de-industrialisation in advanced countries, is 
ascribed in this doctrine to the following two causes: (a) the 
long-run factors mentioned above which lead to a shift from 
manufacturing to service employment; (b) it is argued that the 
comparative advantage in a range of manufactured products has 
shifted from the North to the South. This leads to a temporary 
problem of structural adjustment for which the proper remedy is 
to reduce the rigidities in the North's labour markets rather than 
to call for protection or subsidies. 
15
 
 
37. Building on the work of Sayers and Kaldor, Singh 
(1987,1989,1990) put forward an alternative non-neoclassical 
conceptual framework for investigating this issue. In this 
framework, although the long-term factors of economic development 
 do cause de-industrialisation in advanced countries, trade can 
also significantly contribute to it and to overall unemployment. 
Singh advanced twin concepts of an 'efficient manufacturing 
sector' and that of 'long-term structural disequilibrium' for 
examining this issue for an advanced economy like the UK. His 
                     
     
15
 This view is best expressed in Beenstock (1984) and in 
the recent American Express Gold Medal winning essay, Brown and 
Julius (1993). 
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analysis suggests that industrial countries with 'inefficient 
manufacturing sectors' or those in 'long-term structural 
disequilibrium' can be seriously disadvantaged by trade (which 
could lead to speedier de-industrialisation  as well as to rising 
overall unemployment). In summary, in Singh's framework, the 
answer to the question whether, and to what extent, 
deindustrialisation in an advanced economy is due to third world 
competition in manufactures, requires the following chain of 
causation to be established: 
 
(a)  Taking into account its interactions with the rest of the 
world, is the economy in 'long-term structural 
disequilibrium' ?
16
 
(b)  If so, is this disequilibrium due to trade in manufactures 
rather than, for example,  to trade in services? 
(c)  If the structural disequilibrium is, indeed, because of the 
trade in manufactures, is this due to competition with the 
Third World or with other advanced countries (eg. Japan)? 
 
38. Singh's (1989) empirical analysis for the 1970s, showed that 
for an advanced industrial economy with an 'inefficient' 
manufacturing sector like the UK, trade in manufactures did lead 
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 An advanced country like the UK is regarded as being in 
long term structural disequilibrium if its manufacturing import 
and export propensities are such that the country is unable to 
achieve current account balance at a desired level of employment 
and a desired rate of growth of real wages. In this 
conceptualisation, for an industrial country, manufacturing 
performance in the world economy is regarded as the key to the 
achievement of the desired current account balance (and hence the 
country's ability to reach its long term growth potential).  
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to a net loss of jobs.
17
. But importantly, the study also showed, 
that it was not manufacturing trade with the third world but rather 
with the other advanced countries which was the main cause of the 
disequilibrium. On the contrary, Singh estimated that at least 
in the 1970s, UK manufacturing trade with the newly industrialising 
countries, led to an increase in trade balance, and hence in total 
output. It probably also generated a small net rise in employment 
rather than a fall. However, the econometric analysis also showed 
that there was evidence that if British industry did not become 
more efficient, in the longer term Britain's trade with the NICs 
is likely to become as disequilibriating as that with the advanced 
countries.  
 
39. In analysing the impact of third world competition on advanced 
industrial economies as a whole, the important conceptual point 
in Singh's analysis was to distinguish between countries like the 
UK with 'inefficient' manufacturing sectors (which led to these 
economies being chronically balance of payments constrained at 
desired levels of output and employment) and those like Japan and 
West Germany with 'efficient' manufacturing industry (i.e. 
industry generates enough net exports to ensure the required 
current account balance at desired levels of employment or overall 
economic growth). Empirical evidence (see OECD 1979) indicates 
that the North's trade balance in manufacturing with NICs was 
                     
     
17
 "Gross job" losses, however, can and often do cause 
enormous social distress even if there is equivalent employment 
created elsewhere. New service sector jobs often pay less and are 
less protected by union rights and other benefits than the 
manufacturing jobs that dissappear. Bluestone and Harrison (1982) 
called particular attention to this phenomenon. 
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positive and it increased over the period 1970-77.  This suggested 
that even if in some balance of payments constrained advanced 
countries, manufacturing trade with NICs had become 
disequilibriating in the 1970s, it was likely in general to have 
been a far smaller source of disequilibrium than the trade among 
the industrial countries themselves.   
 
40. In the 1980s the situation has been rather different. There 
is, for example, evidence of a significant job losses in the U.S 
as a result of its manufacturing trade with developing countries. 
 But, barring a few East Asian countries, as Marshall (1989) 
rightly pointed out, this fall in employment was much more due 
to a loss of U.S exports rather than to a huge increase in imports. 
The U.S merchandise exports to the developing countries declined 
by 24.4% in real terms between 1980 and 85 compared with 11.7% 
reduction in total exports.  This was, however mainly due to 
`import strangulation' in developing countries as a consequence 
of the debt crises.  (Singh, 1986, Khan and Knight, 1988).  The 
U.S exports to heavily indebted Latin America countries fell for 
example by 30.9% during this period.  On the other hand, job losses 
arising from the U.S trade with an industrialising economy like 
Taiwan, which was running sizeable trade surpluses in the 1980s 
was more likely due to its greater penetration of the U.S market. 
 Taiwan was not subject to import compression arising from the 
debt crises in the way the Latin American countries were in the 
last decade. 
 
41. To sum up, the evidence suggests that in the 1970s the 
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North-South trade in manufacturing poducts did not in general lead 
to trade imbalances or a net loss of either manufacturing or total 
output in the North; rather it provided a positive impulse to 
industrial development in the advanced countries. The main reason 
for this is that although the NICs manufactured exports to the 
North expanded very fast, the North's exports to the South grew 
even faster in the 1970s. The developing countries need technology 
and capital goods from the advanced economies. The NICs used the 
opportunity provided by easy availability of credit at almost zero 
real interest rates in the mid 1970s to greatly increase their 
imports of capital goods to accelerate their industrialisation 
process. However, in the 1980s, as a consequence of the debt crisis 
Latin American NICs became severely balance of payments 
constrained and they were obliged to sharply curtail their imports 
from industrial countries. Indeed, during much of the 1980s, the 
Latin American countries were running trade surpluses amounting 
to as much as 5 per cent of their GDP. They were obliged to do 
so in order to pay debt service to the North's banks. As a 
consequence the North-South trade in manufactures in the 1980s 
provided a negative impulse for the Northern industrial economies. 
 
41. This analysis suggests that in general because of the very 
high propensity to import of the developing countries, the 
North-South industrial trade should not be diseqilibriating for 
the North. It could, however, exacerbate the existing 
disequilibrium between the strong and the weak industrial 
countries. To illustrate, China today has a large trade surplus 
with the United States, but an even larger deficit with Japan. 
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Thus China's overall trade with the North is not a source of 
disequilibrium. The basic problem here is that presumably because 
of the greater competitiveness of Japanese capital goods industry 
relative to that of the US, China exports(generally consumer goods) 
more to the US and imports more from Japan(capital goods).
18
 
 
VII. Meeting the New Challenge 
42. It was noted in section III that the second oil shock saw the 
final abandonment of what may be called the Golden Age pattern 
of development (encompassing both the internal and external rules 
of co-ordination of the economic system).  It is beyond the scope 
of these notes to provide a full discussion of the emerging 
post-1979 pattern.  However, it may be briefly recalled that at 
the international level, instead of attempting to compensate for 
the deflationary effects of the 1979 oil price rise, restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies were strongly reinforced in the U.S 
and adopted by other main industrial countries.  In an 
international economy, ever more closely linked by  `free' and 
gigantic capital movements this resulted in the early 1980s in 
a` beggar-my-neighbour' competitive deflation and a prolonged 
recession.   
 
                     
     
18
 There are other apects of the impact of North-South 
manufacturing trade on the North's economies. Specifically, it 
has been suggested that the stagnation and decline of real wages 
of the blue-collar workers in the US and the growth in wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in the recent 
period has been due to cheap labour imports from developing 
countries. Krugman and Lawrence (1993), Freeman (1993) and 
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) provide analysis and evidence 
against this thesis.  For a different perspective, see Wood 
(1994). 
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43. Although the retreat from the Golden Age institutional 
arrangements has inevitably occurred at different speeds in the 
various countries, there has broadly been a common overall pattern. 
 The specific measures implemented for this purpose since 1980 
have included: legislation to restrict the role of the unions (UK, 
Germany); abolishing norms of indexation  (Italy); relaxing 
employment protection legislation (UK, France); relaxation of 
labour standards and restrictions on welfare provisions (in most 
countries); significant steps towards marketisation and 
privatisation (almost everywhere). Moreover, in the adoption of 
rules about monetary growth and public sector deficits in most 
countries, there has been an implicit abandonment of the full 
employment policies of the Golden Age. The countries of the South 
have also had to implement similar arrangements in order to meet 
the conditionalities of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
 
44.  For vast numbers of people in the South and in the North, 
the post-Golden Age economic era has been exceedingly bleak.  In 
many countries in Africa and Latin America, real wages have fallen 
drastically to the order of 50 per cent or more, and there have 
been vast cut-backs in employment and, instead of a continuing 
industrial revolution, there has been de-industrialization. 
 
45.  Similarly in the North, there has been an enormous increase 
in the amount of unemployed, cuts in social provision and a much 
reduced quality of life for the bottom 30 per cent or so of the 
population.   It is therefore not surprising that the new 
post-Golden Age economic regime has still not gained widespread 
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acceptability in the advanced countries.  As noted earlier, the 
only major success which can be claimed for these policies is a 
fall in the rate of inflation in these economies.  However, this 
'victory' over inflation has come at an exceptionally high cost 
in terms of social justice and economic efficiency.  The extension 
of the role of free markets in the name of efficiency has, 
paradoxically, generated massive inefficiency characterized by 
a huge underutilization of resources worldwide, not least human 
resources.  Thus the average unemployment rate has gone up from 
0.79 per cent of the labour force in West Germany during the Golden 
Age decade, 1964 - 1973, to over 6 per cent in the recent decade, 
 1983 - 1992.  In France, the corresponding increase has been from 
2.2 per cent to 9.7 per cent of the labour force, in the UK from 
2.9 per cent to 9.8 per cent. Eatwell(1994). 
 
46.  It has been suggested by some that the present unemployment 
problems in the world economy, and particularly in the North, have 
been caused by the new technological revolution, based on 
information and communications technology. However, the evidence 
does not support this view, since what the world has witnessed 
in the post-Golden Age period has not been a rise but rather a 
fall in the rate of growth of productivity.  More extensive or 
faster technological change should lead to greater, rather than 
slower, growth of productivity.  Indeed, if productivity growth 
had been as fast as during the Golden Age, the number of unemployed 
would have been far greater than they already are, given the slower 
rate of growth of production.
19
  What this means is that the full 
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 See further Eatwell (1994); Singh (1994);  
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potential of the new technology has not been realized.  
 
47. In addition to the analysis of Section VI, the following 
comparison between the Golden Age and the post-Golden Age periods 
is relevant to the question of the impact of competition from cheap 
labour products from the South on unemployment and real wages in 
the North.  Krugman and Lawrence (1993) point out that in 1990, 
US imports from low wage countries, defined as countries with wage 
rates less than half the US level, were only 2.8 per cent of GDP. 
 Such imports - using the same definition as before, i.e. countries 
paying less than half the US wage - were almost as large in 1960, 
2 per cent of GDP.  These imports at that time came from the then 
low wage countries in Europe as well as from Japan.  Yet during 
the Golden Age the average wage of the American worker more or 
less doubled, whilst, as noted before, it has hardly increased 
in the two decades since then.  The average rate of unemployment 
in the US between 1964 and 1973 was 4.46 per cent compared with 
6.69 per cent between 1983 and 1992. 
 
48.  It is commonplace for international economic organisations 
to argue that the rise in unemployment in the 1980s, particularly 
in the European countries, has been due to labour market rigidities 
and the inflexibility of real wages.
20
  Countries , not just in 
Europe but everywhere, are therefore urged  to institute wage and 
labour market flexibility as the best way to reduce unemployment. 
The proposition in this form cannot withstand serious scrutiny. 
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 see for example IMF (1994) 
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 For example, in the 1980s  countries in Africa and Latin America 
have had massive cuts in real wages.  Yet, instead of an increase, 
they have had a decrease in the level of employment.  On the other 
hand in the Asian countries, real wages have risen at a fast rate 
and so has employment.  Similarly, in the North, the labour markets 
have been much more flexible in the 1980s than they were in the 
1960s, yet the 1960s were characterized by full employment and 
the 1980s (and the 1990s) by large scale unemployment.  There is 
thus no reason to believe that further labour market flexibility 
in the North and in the South, as demanded under the current 
economic regime, will by itself give rise to adequate productive 
employment opportunities. 
 
49. Clearly, the massive rise in unemployment and much reduced 
economic growth in the North in the post-Golden Age era, are not 
mainly due to new technology, cheap labour competition from the 
South or the domestic labour market conditions, but are essentially 
caused by a reduction in the trend rate of growth of world demand, 
compared with the earlier period.  The change in the monetary and 
fiscal policy stance of the OECD governments, which put the fight 
against inflation as the primary objective of economic policy in 
the 1980s, has been a major factor in the reduced rate of growth 
of world demand.  The latter  needs to expand at the rate it did 
in the 1950s and the 1960s,  if the world economy is to achieve 
sufficient growth to bring about full employment of material and 
human resources in the North and the South.   
 
50.  The South itself can take certain steps to improve the 
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employment and poverty situation both through appropriate national 
policies and greater South-South co-operation.  However, despite 
the increased economic strength of a number of developing 
countries, and in view of the great degree of North-South 
interdependence, the South also needs expansionary measures to 
be taken in the North.  The North, in addition to taking its own 
measures to deal with its employment crisis, also needs a 
substantial improvement in the levels of employment and standards 
of living in the South.  Not only does it require markets and 
outlets for investment, but development in the South would help 
reduce the flows of labour from the South searching for employment 
in the North.  To advance on each of these fronts requires action 
on a third: North-South co-operation. 
 
52. However, the demand constraint on world production is not 
technical: rather, the constraint is deeply institutional.  
It cannot simply be relaxed by the leading Northern governments 
changing their fiscal and monetary policies.  A sustainable 
increase in the rate of growth of world demand will only be possible 
if the confrontational free market pattern of development of the 
1980s is abandoned and replaced by more co-operative institutional 
arrangements involving  workers, employers and governments in the 
North as well as more co-operative relationships between the North 
and the South.  
  
53. What would happen if such co-operative arrangements were not 
in place and the OECD governments followed expansionary policies 
in order to reduce unemployment and the world rate of economic 
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growth rose on a sustained basis to any where near the Golden Age 
levels?  Most likely it would lead to increased labour strength 
and militancy in the North in pursuit of higher wages and better 
employment conditions, as well as to a sharp rise in world commodity 
prices, including oil.
21
  This in turn would rekindle inflation 
and thwart the expansionary process.   
 
53. Thus growth rates approaching the Golden Age levels (the sort 
of level required to resolve unemployment problems), with low 
inflation, will only be feasible and sustainable if three basic 
conditions are fulfilled.  First, a new institutional and 
behavioural framework is required internally within the North. 
 And within the South, a major change in policy direction is 
generally required.  On the global scale, a rather different 
system of international arrangements between the North and the 
South is necessary, involving, among other things,  some scheme 
for orderly commodity price movements hitherto rejected by the 
leading OECD governments.  Only if such a mutually co-operative 
pattern of development is instituted would the world be able to 
begin to meet the challenges of the 1990s and beyond. If this 
opportunity is missed, the prospects for employment, democracy 
and social justice, and for political stability would not appear 
to be very strong.
22
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 The sharp fall in real commodity prices in the 1980s has 
been a primary factor in reducing the rate of inflation in 
industrial countries to a low level. See Beckerman and Jenkinson 
(1986).    
     
22
 Moreover to be sustainable, such faster growth of world 
demand and production will have to pay full attention to ecological 
concerns.  This will require the North to recognize the South's 
right to 'ecological space', in the sense of recognizing that, 
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                                           APPENDIX 
 Table 1 
 
 Growth Performance in Developing Countries 
 by Category (a) and Region (b) 
 1965-80 and 1980-90 
  
    Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP 
(%) 
    
      1965-80  
 1980-90 
 
Low income economies   4.9        
   6.1 
China     6.8        
   9.5 
India     3.6        
                                                                
but for the South's underdevelopment, the current and looming 
environmental threats would be that much greater.  The South's 
development cannot be prohibited on environmental grounds.  Both 
North and South will need to economize on scarce materials, and 
increasingly produce products and introduce processes which do 
not damage the environment.     
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   5.3 
Other low income    4.8        
   3.9 
Middle income economies   6.3        
   2.5 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa    4.2        2.1     
East Asia and Pacific   7.3           7.8 
South Asia     3.6  
        5.2 
Latin America and Carribean                                       6.0        1.6              
          ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Notes: 
 
(a) The World Bank defines "low income countries" as those with per capita income of $580 or 
less in 1989.  Middle income countries are defined as those with income per capita of more 
than $580 and less than $6000. 
 
(b) For the lists of countries included in each region, see the source listed below. 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1992 
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